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URS VON DAENIKEN,  
DIRECTOR OF THE SWISS INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SAP 
INTRODUCTION 
As Intelligence officers we are often asked to make statements based on very few clues. 
Whether the pieces of intelligence were self-collected, received by other services or based on 
public sources, the credibility of any good interpretation of the accessible material depends on 
a careful review of all details. 
Analysis can be particularly difficult when original texts need to be translated from a for-
eign language and when they stem from authors of non-western cultures. The following paper 
describes a systematic approach used by the Swiss Intelligence Service (SAP). The procedure 
described is illustrated by the authentic case of messages among extremists going on the web-
site “www.islamic-minbar.com”, a case that is currently being prosecuted by the Swiss Fed-
eral Justice (see also disclaimer in endnote 1). 
For several years, Intelligence Services have been aware that the Internet is used as the 
most important tool for the dissemination of Jihadist propaganda. There are even cases of 
known indoctrination and recruitment of individuals who were turned into violent extremists 
in chat-rooms. Even if it was possible to monitor all terrorist websites permanently, all mes-
sages posted in chat-rooms cannot be controlled. Without permanent monitoring, the intelli-
gence gathered from OSINT or chat-rooms often becomes untraceable and its authors remain 
anonymous. While advanced methods of intelligence analysis such as the described cannot 
replace author-identification, they are still useful for a preliminary evaluation of a given situa-
tion in order to determine which sites or individuals should be more closely observed or even 
investigated. — Urs Von Daeniken 
 
Marc A. Renfer has graduated with a Masters degree in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies 
from University of Berne. He is an expert in Islamism and Oriental languages currently work-
ing as an intelligence analyst in the counter terrorism section of the Swiss Service for Analy-
sis and Prevention (SAP).  
 
Henriette S. Haas, Ph.D. is scientific advisor to the SAP staff and lecturer of forensic psy-
chology at University of Zurich. Author of three books and 40 research papers, she is a for-
mer professor of criminology at the Swiss School of Forensic Science and Criminology at 
University of Lausanne. 
CHALLENGES OF COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYSIS 
Counterterrorism analysts are facing two challenges: either there is very little intelligence to 
work on, or else there is too much. Often the two characteristics are combined, in the sense 
that there is a lot of insignificant information that needs to be evaluated in order to find a few 
important clues that may (or may not) be hidden inside it. Particularly, this is the case in In-
ternet communication, where no physical evidence (such as fingerprints, DNA, handwriting) 
can be collected. Nonetheless, the Internet is one of the most important sources in counterter-
rorism analysis. According to a report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies2, 
monitoring the Internet and extracting information about Jihadists must become a priority: 
“Given the degree to which radical Islamists depend on the web, Western governments must 
 3 
find ways to cultivate the specific technological and linguistic expertise to better penetrate 
these valuable intelligence sources”. 
The secret of good analysts is that they are excellent observers. They work hard to learn 
and memorize everything about the case—and then observe very carefully. Like any human 
activity observation is not just a natural gift, it can be learned and improved by learning a sys-
tematic procedure. The purpose of this paper is to present such an approach and to demon-
strate its application on a case of counter-terrorism analysis. The procedure consists in the 
application of five rules of "Systematic Observation", which will guide and structure the ana-
lytical process in a methodical way. The rules are deduced from epistemology and cognitive 
psychology by the second co-author (Haas).3 
THE CASE: PRESUMED DEMANDS BY HOSTAGE TAKERS IN IRAQ 
The example we present as an illustration is based on a real case of presumed demands of 
hostage takers in Iraq, found on an Islamist website.1 The historical background of the events 
is the following: Since the end of the second Iraq war, European states have soldiers stationed 
in Iraq to help stabilize and reconstruct the country. Late in August 2004, two French jour-
nalists were kidnapped in the southwest of Baghdad. Terrorists spread a video of the captives, 
pleading for help and urging their government to repeal the headscarf law. Some Islamic 
groups confessed to the hostage taking on the Internet, nevertheless, the authenticity of these 
first confessions was analyzed and found dubious. During this period, several agencies of 
homeland security discovered the website “www.islamic-minbar.com” hosted and adminis-
trated in Switzerland.4 It contained a forum on which Jihadist propaganda, such as beheadings 
and war scenery were shown. The attached discussion board was often visited by Islamist 
extremists. On this forum, six messages of the presumed hostage takers were then posted 
under the name of one Abu Muhammad. They fell precisely in the weeks of early September 
2004. The question arose: Are those communiqués authentic manifestos or ransom notes or 
not? By analyzing these messages, reproduced below in Arabic and in English translation, as 
an illustration, we want to address the following methodological issues in this paper:  
 
• What can be deduced from such messages in terms of counterterrorism analysis?  
• How can analysts make the best possible use of such intelligence?  
• Is it possible to distinguish impostors from real terrorists in the absence of physical 
evidence?  
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Table 1:  The first message on www.islamic-minbar.com 
THE IRAQI ISLAMIC ARMY – DECLARATION CONCERNING THE RETAINED FRENCH 
Sender: Abu Muhammad 
Sent:   Sept. 1st, 2004 at 12.37 
Peace be on you  
Declaration issued by the Iraqi Islamic 
Army 
The case of the two French hostages in 
Iraq belongs to the commander of Islam 
and of the Muslims, Sheikh Usama Bin 
Laden – God is behind success We want a 
public answer or a fatwa of the Sheikh and 
we want that the Sheikh publishes it on the 
al-Jazeera channel 
We belong to God and to Him we shall 
return 
The Iraqi Islamic Army 
God is greater, and there is no god towards 
[sic!] God  
No comments. 
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Table 2:  The second message on www.islamic-minbar.com 
LAST APPEAL TO SHEIKH USAMA BIN LADEN CONCERNING THE FRENCH HOSTAGES 
Sender: Abu Muhammad 
Sent:   Sept. 1st, 2004 at 16.21 
In the name of God 
The Iraqi Islamic Army 
The High Commission for Fatwas 
The last appeal 
We address this appeal to the Connamder 
[sic!] of Islam and of the Muslims Sheikh 
Usama Bin Laden so that he will send us a 
fatwa on the case of the two French hos-
tages What should we do with them We 
want an answer within the next five hours 
given the fact that we have sent you already 
an appealn [sic!] before this one We want 
an answer today Give us a fatwa God have 
mercy with you What is the sentence 
May God be behind the decision 
Peace be upon you and the Mercy of God 
The Iraqi Islamic Army 
 
 
Comment by one al-Qayrawani (16.30): 
 
It is impossible that Usama Bin Laden an-
swers within five hours You should wait 
longer or consult the Sharia, which gives 
enough advice whether to kill to have 
mercy or to demand a ransom 
 
 
Comments are not reproduced in the Arabic original. 
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Abu Muhammad's reply (16.35): 
Thank you God bless you 
Yet we want an answer from the Sheikh   
Other comments. 
 
Table 3:  The third message on www. www.islamic-minbar.com 
FROM THE LAND OF THE TWO RIVERS TO THE LAND OF THE TWO HOLY CITIES 
Sender: Abu Muhammad 
Sent:   Sept. 2nd, 2004 at 02.40 
In the name of God the Beneficent the 
Merciful 
Praise to God blessings and peace on 
God’s messenger Muhammad 
So this is an open message from the Land 
of the Two Rivers to the Earth of the Two 
Holy Cities 
We in Iraq deplore the imjustise [sic!] of 
your judgments on us They plead religion 
and they send their airplanes to bomb our 
Land So what imjustise [sic!] is this I want 
you to stops [sic!] the injustice and the tyr-
anny and to frees [sic!] the Land of the 
Two Holy Cities from this  
No place for the infidel among us 
Peace be upon you 
Your brother Abu Muhammad 
 
 
No comments. 
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Table 4:  The forth message on www.islamic-minbar.com 
THE ISLAMIC ARMY HAS NOW DECIDED THE DESTINY OF THE FRENCH HOSTAGES –  
GOD KNOWS BETTER, AND PEACE 
Sender: Abu Muhammad 
Sent:   Sept. 2nd, 2004, at 05.38 
 
In the name of God 
The Iraqi Islamic Army  
God is greater and praise be to God. 
The High Commission of the Army command  
There is no god but God. 
Declaration of the Army 
Paise [sic!] to God who has blessed the Mu-
jahidin with the success of capturing the two 
French. 
Yesterday we have addressed a message to 
Sheikh Usama Bin Laden to demand an 
order on behalf of the two hostages, but he 
has not heard it as we believe 
Thus the last hours will mark the destiny of 
the hostages in Iraq Two solutions lie ahead 
of us either a ransom or a beheading 
The Eminent said «Thereafter it is either 
secure site or ransom… » 
O our God, we have truly asked for a fatwa 
by the Sheikh but we have received nothing o 
our God God be a witness to his defence of 
the believers 
The Iraqi Islamic Army  
Striking armour of the Umma 
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Comment by one Jama'at at-Tawhid al-Islamiyya: 
You should not confuse Europe with the 
USA, Brother Abu Muhammad In recogni-
tion of the European politics and in the 
name of Islam we demand that the hostages 
be freed. 
 
 
Table 5:  The fifth message on www.islamic-minbar.com 
REPLY TO JAMA’AT AT-TAWHID AL-ISLAMIYYA’S COMMENT 
Sender: Abu Muhammad 
Sent:   Sept. 3rd, 2005, at 06.23 
 
In the name of God 
We have expected a fatwa by our Emir the 
Sheikh Usama but it was impossible for him 
to give it to us And alas for this reason we 
have decided to release them It was because 
of the Muslims who would be dissatisfied if 
we had slaughtered them 
The Islamic Army in Iraq 
Peace O Jama'at at-Tawhid al-Islamiyya 
fear God 
 
 
Comment by one al-Maqdisi: 
 
Abu Muhammad, who are you to speak in 
the name of the Iraqi Islamic Army 
You need patience 
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Table 6:  The sixth and last message on www.islamic-minbar.com 
THE ISLAMIC ARMY – LAST DELAY – HERE ARE OUR DEMANDS 
Sender: Abu Muhammad 
Sent:   Sept. 6th, 2004, at 12.13 
 
In the name of God 
The Islamic Army in Iraq  
The High Command 
Military declaration 
After careful deliberations the Army has 
finally decided on the following demands for 
the liberation of the two French hostages 
The recognition of the armistice between 
them and the Sheikh Usama Bin Laden 
The payment of a 5 million dollar ransom 
The commitment to refrain from any military 
or commercial involvement in Iraq 
These demands remain for a maximal dur-
ation of 48 hours until their acceptance Be-
ware and do not deter us like you have done 
at at-Tayfiyya on the day when we wanted to 
deliver them But God will demonstrate your 
mistakes to you in the last 
Remark we want the fulfilment of one of the 
two demands 
 
 
 
 
No comments. 
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Before demonstrating how to analyse systematically such messages (in cases, where there is 
little or no material evidence and almost nothing is known from operations), let us turn to 
some theoretical issues concerning the procedure of scientific observation.  
DEDUCTION OF THE FIRST RULE FROM THEORIES OF PERCEPTION 
 
THE FIRST RULE OF SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION: 
Compare the object of observation to models, theories, standards and similar cases 
 
Karl Popper5 defined observation as a perception; however a perception that has been con-
ceived and prepared in advance: there is always a particular interest, a question or a problem 
preceding an observation, in other words, a theoretical issue. So, if we want to improve our 
case observation, we need to know more about perception. Cognitive theory takes into ac-
count the contribution of the perceiving subject. Ciccone6 wrote: “Perception is an activity. 
Perceiving is not a passive record of reality as a form, which could produce identical repli-
cas. Perception invents and constructs reality, in the process of discovering it.”  
Neisser7, conceiving a synthesis of the “constructivists”’ and the “direct perceptionists”’ 
approaches to cognitive theory, proposed a perceptual cycle involving the perception of 
stimuli, the active exploration and the observer’s pre-existing knowledge: 
 
Table 7: Neisser's perceptual cycle in cognitive psychology (in Eysenck & Keane8) 
 
The schemata contain collections of knowledge derived from past experience. They allow us 
to recognize what is being perceived and to redirect exploration towards more relevant envi-
ronmental stimuli. Note also, that there is the possibility that some clues from the envi-
ronment do not match the schemata. In that case, completing the circle, a schema must be 
modified or the stock of schemata, encoded in our memory, must be enlarged. 
Untrained observers will enter the cycle at point “Exploration” and start directly to explore 
the stimuli. But—and this is our first rule—we can also enter at point “Schemata” by consulting 
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models and scientific literature first, thus improving our personal supply of schemata. The 
search for models and literature should start at the very beginning of a case, to guarantee that no 
important piece of intelligence is irretrievably lost or forgotten. The comparison with a model 
cannot only attract our attention to details otherwise neglected; it can do even more by helping 
to realize differences between the object of observation and the consulted models. Thus we may 
be led to new, unknown or atypical aspects of a case. 
Observing the case of Islamic-Minbar.com with the help of models 
In our case, one would obviously use other examples of Islamist claims or threats as models. 
Unfortunately, there are not many such writings besides some Internet-confessions of uncon-
firmed origin. For instance, most experts consider the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, claiming 
to be the perpetrators of the Madrid attack, as pure fiction9. Hence, we cannot use those letters 
as functional models. Nevertheless, the absence of an undoubtedly genuine claim for respon-
sibility of Jihadist attacks represents an important observation by itself. 
Even though other Islamist claims do not seem to be of much value for examining the  
“islamic-minbar”-case, several other models can serve our purpose as well, and help us find-
ing evidence in the messages posted on the forum: 
 
• Terrorist and hostage takers manifestos and ransom notes in general 
• Internet chats by Muslims on other websites 
• Political and ideological writings of Islamists and Jihadists 
• The Qur’an and other religious texts (Hadith, Fiqh, Fatwas) 
• Arabic language systems (grammar, syntax, style) 
 
By using each of these models, and thus structuring our approach, we can discover a huge 
amount of interesting evidence. Applying linguistics10, we might focus on the term yarhamu-
kum Allah in the second message. It is literally translated by “God have mercy with you” and 
expresses condolences in the dialects of the Middle East, a strange assertion in our context. In 
North-African dialects however, it simply means a polite request, thus perfectly fitting with 
the message’s sense. So, by using a linguistic comparison, we get a first clue on Abu Mu-
hammad’s origin.  
Using religious discourse as a model, another observation refers to the messages begin-
ning with “In the name of God”. This is a shortened version of the Basmala, the religious 
commitment that introduces the chapters of Qur’an as well as other texts with a religious con-
notation. The complete formula “In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate” is 
only present in the third message. 
Another good example of how focussing our observation by the use of models is the find-
ing that hostage taker manifestos usually contain details attesting insider knowledge of the 
case, in order to prove its authenticity. In this respect, our messages do not deliver much. The 
only indication is a reference in the sixth message to a presumed hostage taking or exchange 
incident at a place called at-Tayfiyya. By using open source intelligence as a reference11, we 
can establish that a location in the South of Baghdad bears this name, but we are not able to 
confirm that there has been any occurrence corresponding to the claim on Islamic-
Minbar.com. Nor can we exclude that we are dealing with the information from an insider.  
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RECONSTRUCTING AN EVENT BY PERCEIVING AND INTERPRETING SIGNS 
THE SECOND RULE OF SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION: 
Separate formal aspects from the contents and analyze them separately 
 
Working on a case is reconstructing a unique historical event between multiple actors by tak-
ing into account and interpreting different signs. Thus the sign is the smallest unit of percep-
tion. Nordby12 explained that an important part of observing implies recognizing the sense of 
a sign and the task of reconstructing its meaning within its context. A careful analyst wants to 
take notice of all potential signs, without judging their relevance at first.  
But what is a sign? A simple definition says that a sign can be anything, which determines 
something else. According to Charles S. Pierce13, a sign is “something which stands to some-
body for something in some respect or capacity”. The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure14 
found that the sign is an entity with two faces: the (outer) appearance of the sign and the (in-
ner) meaning of the sign. The appearance of a sign can have no relation at all to its significa-
tion, for instance the appearance of the linguistic sign composed by the four letters  
F–R–O–G has nothing to do with any animal, but by pure convention, the so represented  
word “FROG” bears a meaning which refers to the animal .  
Forensic evidence can be considered as the set of all signs of evidence found on the crime 
scene(s), the victim(s) and potential suspects and the same is true for gathering intelligence on 
a case. Contrary to linguistic signs, which have a universal signification, the meaning of signs 
of evidence is highly individual. Some signs can mean exactly the opposite of their appear-
ance, because they are meant to deceive. For instance, a gift, appearing to be a sign of affec-
tion, can in reality be an attempt to bribe somebody.  
As a consequence of the double nature of the sign (appearance and signification), we can 
state the second principle of systematic observation: It is necessary to consider separately 
those aspects that refer to the formal structure (or appearance) of the object and those that 
refer to its contents (or signification). To avoid mistaken deductions, we must strictly limit 
our observation to the formal structure first and make conclusions on its contents only in a 
latter step. 
Applying the rule of the two sides of the sign to the case 
Regarding the present messages, we shall thus observe first how they were formally com-
posed, and only afterwards what they tell us. So, for the analysis of the website we must trans-
late the messages as accurately as possible, maybe even in several versions, and including 
also such characteristics as spelling mistakes. 
On the formal level, we can state that the messages affirm being written by a group-
member of the Iraqi Islamic Army (al-Jaysh al-Islami al-Iraqi), a Jihadist terror group, which 
does indeed exist. According to Raphaeli15 it is known to have taken hostages and “threat-
ened to execute a Philippine national unless the Philippines withdrew its small contingent of 
60 soldiers from Iraq. The threat was taken seriously and the Philippines withdrew its sol-
diers.” However, we have no proof whatsoever linking the messages to this Iraqi terror group. 
The IT address alone will tell us next to nothing. Extremists and terrorists use changing IT 
addresses that are assigned to a variety of countries. It is also possible, that an Iraqi terrorist 
made a veiled telephone call to a sympathizer somewhere else, who put the message on the 
net.  
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There is another interesting piece of evidence in terms of formal linguistics, namely the 
spelling mistakes. The sentence in the first message: “There is no god towards (ila) God” 
should be: “There is no god but (illa) God”. This verse reflects the Shahada, the core belief of 
Islam. It is part of the call for prayer and pronounced several times a day by every practicing 
Muslim. It is noteworthy that our perpetrator wrote incorrectly this most basic and respectable 
saying. Was he in such a stress or in a hurry that he made a spelling mistake16 (he wrote the 
phrase correctly in the forth message)? As we know from other hostage takings, it is a fact 
that perpetrators are often under great stress once they have the hostages in their power. Yet, 
regarding the frequency of spelling mistakes in general, the third message contains consider-
ably more typos than the other ones—a significant discrepancy. 
OBSERVING COMPLEX OBJECTS BY STRUCTURING THEM 
THE THIRD RULE OF SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION: 
Structure the object into functional elements (according to the models),  
and explore each of them 
 
Looking at all of the six messages on the Islamist website, we are facing the problem of losing 
the overview of all the material there is. If we want to increase the accuracy of our case ob-
servation, we need—above all—to perceive and describe all signs of evidence and not just 
some of them. In order to achieve this, the analyst must make out the underlying structure(s) 
of the messages and define all functional elements belonging to a proposed structure. Each 
element must then be described individually in a process that can be time-consuming. If one 
selects only what comes at hand, like an untrained observer, one may be tempted to interpret 
the case on partial grounds and be totally mislead. Fragmentation of the evidence by an unsys-
tematic approach can also cause fruitless discussions and erroneous decisions. 
Bierwisch17 referred to the principle of structuralism: “[…] you don’t observe human 
communication and behaviour as isolated phenomena, but on a basis of a systematic relation-
ship, which determines their structure.” For the development of the principles of systematic 
observation we need to know more about structuralism. Linguistics, the science of the struc-
ture of language, was first to deal with the difficulties of dissecting an immaterial object into 
its functional elements. Grawitz18 concluded: “For de Saussure, the true object of linguistics, 
far from being offered to immediate observation, is the product of a construction. […] Struc-
turalism has a very peculiar conception of the linguistic system: it is essentially considered as 
a system of signs. […] The system appears like a net of differences between signs […] Lin-
guistic research appears from then on mostly as a definition of minimal units, separated by an 
operation of commutation: whatever changes the meaning when it is substituted by another 
element can be considered a minimal unit.” 
Here is an illustration from linguistics: 
 
Table 8:  Smallest units within textual structures 
The word The letter of the alphabet The typographic strike 
| some | bad | words | | s |  o  | m | e | | a | 
   
| some | nice | words | | s |  a  | m | e | | a | 
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While changing the sense, the word and the letter both function as minimal units of a lin-
guistic object. The serif—on the other hand—cannot be considered a minimal unit in a lin-
guistic model, as it is only modifying the shape of the letter but not the meaning of the mes-
sage. In another model however, e.g. hand-writing analysis, the stroke can be essential as a 
determinative minimal unit within the systematic observation. 
Marvin Minsky19, in his theory of artificial intelligence, pointed out that within each struc-
ture, there is an inherent function, and the components represent its sub-functions. Grawitz20 
described the position of the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss21 who applied this 
method to social science: “[…] the structure implies limited characteristics. Combinations and 
transformations of them permit to pass from one system to another and to understand their rela-
tionships. The idea of a structure involves an element of transformation and of prevision.” 
Structural analysis of the messages on Islamic-Minbar.com 
Applying the third rule of observation, we begin by dissecting the entity into its essential ele-
ments. After having defined the main units (dimensions, aspects, functional elements), you 
have to observe each one of these units of the object separately with regard to its function. 
When looking into a file, you have the envelope and its contents: pages with entries, memos, 
letters, etc. There is also the paper, the ink, the way to write (by hand, on the type writer, on 
the computer), and maybe drawings. In an interview on videotape, you might separate as 
structural components the verbal communication from the non-verbal communication of each 
participating person by running sound and images on different channels. 
Obviously, there are many different ways to structure a communication into functional 
components. The easiest ways is establishing the temporal sequence of events, often with the 
help of graphical programming tools such as Analyst's notebook (i2). 
 
Table 9:  Messages on www.Islamic-Minbar.com as revealed by pre-analysis 
 
Wed 9-1-2004 at 12.37 THE IRAQI ISLAMIC ARMY – DECLARATION – no comments 
Wed 9-1-2004 at 16.21 LAST APPEAL TO SHEIKH + comment by al-Qayrawani + reply 
Thu 9-2-2004 at 2.40  FROM THE LAND OF THE TWO RIVERS – no comments 
Thu 9-2-2004 at 05.38 THE ISLAMIC ARMY DECIDED  + comment by Jama'at at-T. 
Fri 9-3-2004 at 06.22  REPLY TO JAMA’AT AT-TAWHID  + comment by al-Maqdisi 
Mon 9-6-2004 at 12.13 THE ISLAMIC ARMY – LAST DELAY – no comments 
December 2004  The French hostages were released 
 
In Table 9, we perceive a conspicuous absence of messages during Saturday and Sunday, the 
two days of the (Christian) weekend. This opens several possibilities of interpretation: 1) it is 
pure coincidence 2) Abu Muhammad has to work during weekends 3) Abu Muhammad works 
during the week and the messages are part of his work schedule or 4) he only has access to the 
Internet on weekdays (e.g. by an internet café closed on weekends). The weekend gap aston-
ishes additionally because in Iraq, as in most Islamic countries, the weekend falls on Friday, 
and not on Saturday and Sunday. Thus, we may state the hypothesis that the author of the 
messages does not live in Iraq, but in the Western world, or in one of the rare Islamic count-
ries following the Christian schedule such as Morocco. 
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Besides the temporal sequence, there are many other ways of structuring our material. 
Finding them is in fact the main intellectual challenge of systematic interpretation. Models 
often offer some help in establishing possible structures. Here are some common ways of dis-
secting messages into their structural components: 
 
• Grammatical:  words, sentences, punctuation marks, paragraphs 
• Stylistic:  personal, religious, poetic, scientific, businesslike 
• Graphical:   layout, stains, letters of the alphabet, numbers 
• Functional:   date, salutation, main body, complimentary clause, signature 
• Associative:  establishing links and hierarchy between members and  
    associates of a terrorist group  
 
In the investigation of major cases, one should analyze meticulously every possible structure 
promising meaningful results, according to the different ways of dissecting the object. Here 
we focus on just one example, to avoid that the article becomes boringly long. We pursue our 
analysis of the messages on www.islamic-minbar.com by studying their sociological struc-
ture. The following social entities can be determined:  
 
Subject:   Sociological reference: Colour: 
Islamic Army   group     (pink) 
Bin Laden   global Jihad    (brown) 
God, the Prophet  religion    (green) 
French hostages  economy    (light blue) 
Iraqi People   nation     (red) 
the West   politics    (dark blue) 
Muslims   culture    (green) 
the author himself  individual    (orange) 
 
Using these categories, we can now split the text concerning its principal references in every 
respective statement. Most illustrative is the use of different colours, a procedure derived 
from Sapir’s method of analyzing texts with SCAN.22 (The reader may mark the messages in 
the proposed manner.) The so achieved pattern shows that the dominant reference is the group 
of the Islamic Army. Yet, despite only one presumed author, hierarchical levels within the 
organization seem to have varying titles (the “Fatwa Office”, the “High Commission of the 
Command”, the “High Command” …). Besides reasonable doubts about such a high and 
complex degree of organization, it seems unlikely that every time a different unit of the group 
should be responsible for issuing the bulletins on the hostage case.  
Second in the line of importance is the reference to Bin Laden, uttered in tone of voice 
that is surprisingly disrespectful towards the presumed “Commander of Islam and of the Mus-
lims”. Further, the references to the hostages remain sparse, containing no specific informa-
tion and no proof at all that the person communicating under the alibi of “Abu Muhammad” 
or under the “Iraqi Islamic Army” were really detaining them.  
Finally, we can conclude that the third message is distinctly different from the others in 
several ways: it is the only one with a written in the first person singular (reference to the in-
dividual) and the only one expressing concerns for the Iraqi people (reference to the nation). 
Its first sentence is the only complete citation of the Basmala (“In the name of God, the Gen-
tle, the Compassionate”) whereas the other messages begin only with the shortened version of 
this formula. Contrary to the other messages, the third message contains no reference to Bin 
Laden and to the group. 
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LOOKING FOR INCOHERENT AND CONTRADICTING SIGNS 
THE FORTH RULE OF SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION: 
Explore inconsistencies, errors, contradictions an coincidences on the basis of the structure 
 
By observing each of the structural elements we get a comprehensive picture of the object. 
But these facts do not always constitute a coherent picture. It is important to observe and to 
note all signs of evidence even if they don’t fit, without levelling out inconsistencies, nor ex-
aggerating them. Sometimes it happens that one hits upon facts that make no sense at all. 
Should one leave them aside to avoid leaving an impression of incompetence? Most certainly 
not! On the contrary, it is a sign of professional authority to be able to admit that something is 
not (yet) understood. The very essence of every science is to register everything, especially 
the incomprehensible, and not only that what is already well known (petitio principi). It is 
also a matter of professional integrity to document details that seemingly contradict the given 
explanation. 
Semiotics, the scientific study of signs, differentiates between natural and artificial signs 
(e.g. Umberto Eco23). This distinction is especially important when it comes to inconsistencies. 
Natural signs occur without someone’s intention to send a message (e.g. psychiatric symptoms, 
mistakes, chemical processes in a dead body, signature aspects in violent crime) whereas artifi-
cial signs are wilful communications (e.g. threat letters, staging of crimes to manipulate the pol-
ice, the bait presented to potential victims in a con approach). The pioneers of profiling have 
pointed out that making this distinction is essential in criminal investigation.24, 25 
The fourth rule represents the classic reasoning of Sherlock Holmes, so to say. Yet it is not 
the only and certainly not the first critical thinking process involved in counterterrorism analysis 
or in solving criminal cases. Analysts pay a lot of attention to inconsistencies because they sus-
pect them of being artificial signs, the assumption being that such signs possess a systematic 
value because they are messages from the suspect who is trying to blur the facts or to manipu-
late readers. But this is not always the case. People lie for many different reasons and they may 
hide things that have nothing to do whatsoever with the present case.  
Exploring inconsistencies, contradictions and bizarre coincidences comes after the analysis 
of the objects in terms of functional elements or sub-units, because they need be interpreted on 
the grounds of the entire case, by comparing different elements with each other. A spelling mis-
take has another meaning if the text is written by a well-educated person than if it contains doz-
ens of spelling mistakes. 
When contradictions happen at the beginning of a case, or when they are part of a witness’ 
or suspect’s testimony, this is useful for analysts and investigators. However, sometimes there 
are subtle inconsistencies, which disturb a seemingly obvious case. Those are much more 
likely to pass unacknowledged. They can even make the analyst feel annoyed and he or she 
may be tempted to shove them aside, because they are likely to destroy their “beautiful” case. 
Giddens26,27 explained: “The work of Kuhn and other authors show that researchers ignore 
or want to make disappear with far-fetched explanations all those results of their experiments 
or observations which are incompatible with their theories or which would even prove them 
false.” Therefore obeying the fourth rule also means to submit oneself to the necessity of tedi-
ous supplementary examinations. 
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Inconsistencies in the messages on www.Islamic-Minbar.com 
Contrary to other Islamist writings, the messages of Abu Muhammad lack the usual religious 
(theological and jurisprudential) quotations. The only citation of a Qur’anic Verse, marked by 
introducing God as speaker, is found in the forth message: “The Eminent said: Thereafter it is 
either secure site or ransom”. By consulting a concordance we can verify that the quote is 
indeed of Qur’anic origin. The citation stems from the fourth verse of the 47th chapter (Sura 
Muhammad) saying: “Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; 
At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): Thereafter 
(is the time for) either generosity or ransom: Until the war lays down its burdens. […]”.28 By 
comparing the short citation in the message, consisting of only five Arabic words, with the 
original text, we remark that the Internet-author made not less than three mistakes. Beside a 
spelling error and one missing conjunction, he also replaced one word by another that makes 
no real sense. Therefore, it becomes obvious that he did not want to invest much effort in the 
study or in the correct citation of the very source of his pretended calling (the Qu’ran). 
In the sixth message, we notice a contradiction in the final sentence: “Remark: We want 
acceptance of one of the two demands”, when the author made three different demands just 
two lines before. Moreover, three days before, all claims had already been dismissed by the 
fifth message. Another inconsistency concerns the designation of the group. Generally it is 
called “Iraqi Islamic Army”, but in the last two messages it appears as the “Islamic Army in 
Iraq”. Is this an indication that they abandon the intention of being representative for the Iraqi 
people? Such a shift is barely plausible.  
Furthermore, we saw that Abu Muhammad, or whoever hides behind this name, has 
shown open arrogance and impatience towards Bin Laden. He makes unrealistic demands to 
his perceived hero, thus loosing credibility.  
In the light of these elements we must ask, whether this picture is consistent with a mem-
ber of an organized and operative Jihadist group and with the alleged situation. It is true, that 
in a study in the mid-1980es Strentz29 found Middle Eastern terror groups to be poorly edu-
cated, unskilled, unemployed, illiterate, undisciplined, and ill-trained. Likewise, the debrief-
ing of former hostages of a Jihadist group in the Sahara has shown that some of the terrorists 
were disorganized and childish individuals. The poorly educated style of the messages in it-
self is therefore not contradicting the hypothesis of genuine communications by a terrorist 
group. So, as is often the case, we have here some non-conclusive evidence. We also take care 
to note and to comment on it, because in the context of more pieces of intelligence this may 
turn out to reveal new insights at a later stage of the analysis.  
FIND NEGATIVE SIGNS: WHAT IS MISSING? 
THE FIFTH RULE OF SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION: 
Discover the absence of signs (negative signs) on the grounds of what should be found  
according to the models’ structures 
 
The last characteristic that distinguishes the excellent observer from the ordinary is the ca-
pacity to find out what is missing. In psychiatry a lack of important mental functions (for ex-
ample the lack of emotional responses), is called a negative symptom. Nordby30 noted on the 
difference between signs of evidence and proof: “Absence of proof is not proof of absence, 
but the absence of a sign can itself be a sign.” 
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For instance in a case with several witnesses, not all of which are cooperative, one can 
systematically filter out what has been omitted by whom, in order to have more material for 
the following interrogations. The lack of the appropriate emotional response from supposed 
victims of crime can also be an important clue that something is wrong with their statements. 
Statement analysis31 often focuses on missing elements in a communication. 
Missing signs in the messages posted on Islamic-Minbar.com 
Compared to other manifestos and to experience, several points are missing in our case: There 
is no ideological or political program proffered, only a rather vague sympathy for Jihad and 
the Muslims. No leader of the group is ever mentioned and no emblem is shown either. Even 
if the first absence can be explained by protecting the anonymity of wanted suspects, the or-
ganization’s insignia is known to the public from a (meanwhile blocked) website and from 
other publications about the group.32  
Furthermore, Abu Muhammad—contrary to other hostage takers who enforce their claims 
by some proof of the capturing of the victim—offers no information at all about the hostage. 
Finally, all the information posted on www.islamic-minbar.com could just as well be recycled 
from the media. 
CHECKING HYPOTHESES FOR PLAUSIBILITY WITH A CROSS-TABLE 
Kind33 defined: “[…] the identification of pattern in crime investigation may perhaps be de-
fined simply as the identification of a deterministic sequence in a series of apparently chance 
events.” An unsystematic exploration of potentially meaningful details does bear a certain 
danger: How can we be sure that we have collected all crucial elements? How can we know 
that we have not been misled into too much speculation? How can we avoid losing ourselves 
in farfetched hypotheses? What is to be done when a controversy over different conflicting 
hypotheses arises? Nordby34 explained why observers can come to very different conclusions 
on the same case: “Part of seeing a sign involves recognizing its significance and building it 
into an inference. Dismissing signs and what follows deductively from them as irrelevant along 
one path, and including them as relevant along another, may result in contradictory conclu-
sions drawn from the same observations.”  
Based on this, we can say that the processes of observation and interpretation are composed 
by two inverse ways of thinking: inclusion and exclusion. At first we need to include every as-
pect that could eventually be essential, then, in a second step, we have to dismiss everything 
that is not important. But at the beginning we don’t know which is which—even if we believe 
to know. Given the fact that signs of evidence don’t necessarily speak for themselves, we are 
obliged to complete our knowledge about a case in a most exhaustive way.  
This task can be accomplished by the applying the five rules of systematic observation. But 
in a second phase of reasoning, we have to criticize ourselves on all paths, which seem to be too 
speculative and we have to set aside (without eliminating it completely) successively everything 
that seems to be less important. Again, we want to leave nothing to chance. We need to do this 
process in a rational and methodological way and account for all the information we gathered in 
the previous phase by doing it with the help of a checklist (Table 10).  
Thus, we now refocus on the initial question of authenticity and the hypothesis (called H) 
that Abu Muhammad (AM) is indeed representing a militant group in Iraq who have taken the 
French hostages. The antithesis (not-H) states that somebody else hides behind the alibi of this 
name: somebody who wants to pull a hoax or a wannabe terrorist producing propaganda. It is 
also useful to note all signs pointing to neither of the hypotheses (indeterminate signs), because 
later, when we might have more information, we might want to re-adapt our hypotheses. 
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Table 10:  Plausibility check of the hypotheses in a cross-table 
Signs for H  
(AM represents terrorists) 
Indeterminate signs Signs for not-H  
(AM = wannabe-terrorist) 
AM declares himself being a 
member of the Iraqi Islamic 
Army. 
AM is not a scholar of the 
Qur’an and religion.  
According to dialectal 
markers, AM seems to be of 
Maghrebian origin. 
AM is not denounced as an 
impostor by the group’s 
known sources. 
AM seems to be intimidated 
by Jama'at at-Tawhid al-
Islamiyya. 
No proof for the authenticity 
of AM’s claims is ever de-
livered. 
AM mentions an incident in 
at-Tayfiyya that seems to be 
insider’s knowledge. 
Internet forums are available 
for everybody, even those 
with membership restriction. 
Another chat-room partici-
pant doubts the authority of 
AM and his claims. 
AM refers to Bin Laden and 
his global Jihad concept. 
AM makes a lot of ortho-
graphical mistakes, seems to 
be uneducated. 
AM lacks logic in his de-
mands and renounces that 
they are all fulfilled. 
AM could be under con-
siderable time stress. 
 More than one author (di-
vergent third message) uses 
the pseudonym AM. 
  AM respects Christian 
weekend not applied in Iraq. 
  The name of the group and 
its sub-units lack consis-
tency. 
  AM has an arrogant and 
impatient attitude towards 
Bin Laden. 
  The messages of AM lack a 
clear ideological or political 
standpoint. 
  AM offers no proof that he 
is familiar with the hostage.  
... ... ... 
 
Sometimes, it is not easy to categorize the collected signs. For example, one could presume 
that there is a whole group behind Abu Muhammad, since different people seem to write 
under this pseudonym, and classify this observation in the first column (for H). But as experts 
in Islamist terrorism we know that Jihadists generally do not share pseudonyms and will 
classify the information pointing towards the antithesis “not-H”. 
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For the plausibility check, a qualified expert must compare the columns. One should not 
only take into account the sheer number of signs pointing towards one hypothesis, but also 
their authenticity and their specific significance. If the one column exceeds considerably the 
other regarding the amount of its signs, we must also consider soft criteria such as which 
signs belong to the best confirmed intelligence and which are most significant.  
In our case a comprehensive view of table 10 points towards the assumption that Abu 
Muhammad does not belong to a group of hostage takers and is not member of an Islamist 
militant group in Iraq. 
If the category “indeterminate” should contain most of the entries, the collected signs are 
probably not suitable to favor one particular hypothesis and the riddle remains unresolved.  
ADVANTAGES OF THE METHOD OF SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION 
The method of systematic observation presents the obvious advantage to provide the analyst 
with an inventory of all relevant pieces of intelligence. Traditional conclusions are usually 
justified by a handful of arguments, thus permitting other analysts to offer totally different 
conclusions by stressing the importance of other pieces of information. On such a basis, no 
one can decide whose arguments are better, because the entire set of all signs of evidence re-
mains vague.  
For example, one analyst could discard the hypothesis on the main basis of the linguistic 
signs, claiming that a representative of an Iraqi insurgent group can not speak a Maghrebian 
idiom. However, another analyst may counter this argument by pointing out that volunteers 
from all Arab countries are fighting in the Iraqi insurgence.35 Admitting that a degree of un-
certainty always persists, the result of an intelligence analysis becomes more credible on the 
basis of a comprehensive picture of all signs. 
Another advantage is the fact that the collection of intelligence was not guided in a teleo-
logical way by an initial question. Hence, the assembled signs can easily serve to verify any 
other hypothesis. For instance, some signs indicate an immature character (unrealistic de-
mands, fresh attitude, being intimidated when confronted with a name of another group etc.). 
We may therefore presume that the author of the messages could be an adolescent Maghre-
bian living in Europe full of his own importance who likes to show off while chatting on the 
web. This supposition is also of concern for Homeland security agencies, as disoriented ado-
lescents seeking recognition are easy prey to manipulation and are actively targeted by terror-
ist groups for recruitment. 
Now, to test this new hypothesis, we do not need to re-examine all six messages. We just 
have to redistribute the listed signs into a new cross-table and to assess it in terms of plausi-
bility, while some signs might have to be weighted differently. Anyway, the analysis will pro-
ceed significantly faster now. The more complex and changing an object of observation is, the 
greater is the benefit of the systematic approach, particularly for the continuing analysis of 
extremist groups and their evolving activism.  
SUMMARY 
The five easily memorized formulas of Systematic Observation help the analyst to be a more 
proficient observer and to make sure that nothing has been left out. They are: 
 
I. Compare the object of observation to models or to similar cases. 
II. Separate formal aspects from the contents and analyze them separately. 
III. Structure the object into functional elements, and explore every one of them. 
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IV. Explore inconsistencies, contradictions, mistakes, or astonishing coincidences. 
V. Discover the absence of signs (negative signs of evidence). 
 
Only after going through the process of systematically registering every import detail, we are 
able to draw first hypotheses. Then, hypotheses must be checked for their plausibility in list-
ing systematically every sign for and every sign against them, as well as all indeterminate 
signs, too, in order to get a clear view of the case, and to ensure the best use of the available 
intelligence.  
It is true that the consequent use of those formulas demands a considerable initial effort, 
which can only be afforded in cases of some importance. But then, with experience and rou-
tine, analysts will grasp much more signs of evidence right from the beginning, and save 
themselves a lot of unnecessary work that can be caused by pursuing wrong assumptions. In 
the long run, the assembled inventory of signs evidence does not loose its value. Undoub-
tedly, by applying the presented rules of systematic observation, the result of our work will be 
of higher analytical value.  
REFERENCES 
1 The case-presentation in this paper and its conclusions were specifically adapted and short-
ened for teaching purposes. As we present this example, all information used in this paper is 
drawn from open source intelligence. It is understood that interpretations based on other 
sources (field operations, signal intelligence, human intelligence, etc.) could lead to different 
results. Furthermore: The authors of the paper and the Director of the Swiss Intelligence Ser-
vice SAP have no part at all in the prosecution of the case and are not aware of the evidence 
collected in the subsequent criminal investigation. This illustration reflects only a small and 
isolated part of the available evidence of the real case. Under no circumstances can the con-
tents of this paper be used to prove, support, or contest anything in Court.  
2 Center for Strategic and International Studies (April 2006), Currents and Crosscurrents of 
Radical Islam, Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism, Washington D.C.  
3 Henriette S. Haas, „Kriminalistischer Erkenntnisgewinn durch systematisches Beobachten“, 
in: Kriminalistik N° 57, 2003: pp. 93-100. (Engl. translation: Systematic Observation in the 
Criminal Investigation).  
Henriette S. Haas, „Vom Nichtwissen zum Wissen“, in: Ungewußt - Zeitschrift für angewand-
tes Nichtwissen, N° 12, 2005, www.uni-siegen.de/~ifan/ungewu/heft12/index.htm (Engl. 
translation: From Ignorance to Knowledge). 
4 The site was closed by the Swiss provider after consultation with the responsible authorities 
on the 10th of September 2004. 
5 Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach Oxford,, Oxford University 
Press, 1972. 
6 Albert Ciccone, L’observation clinique, Paris, Editions Dunod, 1998, p.17. 
7 Ulrich Neisser, Cognition and Reality, San Francisco, Freeman, 1976. 
8 Micheal W. Eysenck & Mark T. Keane, Cognitive Psychology, Hove/East Sussex (UK), 
Taylor & Francis,1995, p.81. 
9 Concerning the doubts on the existence of the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades see 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2368408. Pictures of the pre-
 22 
presumed letter of the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades claiming the Madrid attacks on 
http://www.siol.net/photo/gallery-450/Pismot.jpg, and 
http://i.esmas.com.image/0/000/003/350/car_N.jpg. ..  
10 Compare Richard S. Harell, Harvey Sobelman (Ed.), A Dictionnary of Moroccan Arabic, 
and D.R. Woodhead, Wayne Beene (Ed.), A Dictionnary of Iraqi Arabic, both Washington 
D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2003 and 2004. 
11 End of July 2004, U.S. and Iraqi forces carried out security operations there, arresting 25 
armed men on suspicion of being involved in an attack in Mahmoudiya (Source: 
http://dahrjamailiraq.com/mosaic/mosaic.php?id=305&con=256). 
12 Jon J. Nordby, Dead Reckoning: The Art of Forensic detection, Washington D.C., CRC 
Press, 2000, p. 206. 
13 Charles S. Pierce, Collected Papers, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1931-35, 
p. 228. 
14 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, Paris, Grande Bibliothèque Payot, 
1995 (Original 1916). 
15 Nimrod Raphaeli, Iraqi Elections (III): The Islamist and Terrorist Threats, Middle East 
Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Jan. 18th, 2005, p.3, http://www.memri.org. 
16 On an arabic keyboard, the two letters making the difference between the words towards 
(ila) and but (illa) are positionned next to each other. 
17 Manfred Bierwisch, Strukturalismus: Geschichte, Probleme und Methoden, Frankfurt a.M., 
Suhrkamp, 1966, p. 78. 
18 Madeleine Grawitz, Méthodes des sciences sociales, Paris, Editions Dalloz, 2001, p. 318. 
19 Marvin Minsky, Mentopolis, 1990, p. 122. 
20 Madeleine Grawitz, op.cit., p.431. 
21 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale, Paris, Edition Plon, 1958. 
22 Avinoam Sapir, SCAN Reports,1998, http://www.lsiscan.com/products.htm. 
23 Umberto Eco, Segno, Milano, Istituto Editoriale Internazionale, 1973, and Umberto Eco, 
Einführung in die Semiotik, München, UTB Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994. 
24 John E. Douglas, Ann W. Burgess, Allen G. Burgess & Robert K. Ressler, Crime 
Classification Manual: A Standard System for Investigating and Classifying Violent Crimes, 
New York, Lexington Books Macmillan, 1992, pp. 249, 259. 
25 Ulrich Oevermann, Erwin Leidinger, Andreas Simm, Thomas Störmer & Jörg Tykwer, 
Kriminalistische Datenerschliessun:. Zur Reform des Kriminalpolizeilichen Meldedienstes, 
Sonderband der BKA-Forschungsreihe, Wiesbaden, 1994, pp. 169, 121-308. 
26 Anthony Giddens, Interpretative Soziologie, Frankfurt a.M., Campus Verlag,1984, p. 167. 
27 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Chicago,University of Chicago, 
1962. 
28 Quoted from Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Quran, English and Arabic, 
Amana Publications, Beltsville/Maryland, 1997. 
 23 
29 Th. Strentz, “A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile: Past and Present”, FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, April 1987, pp. 13-19. 
30 Nordby, op.cit., p.63 
31 Sapir, op.cit.; Susan H. Adams, “Statement Analysis: What Do Suspects’ Words Really 
Reveal?”, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol. 65(10), 1996. pp. 2-20;  Sharon S. Smith & 
Roger W. Shuy, “Forensic Psycholinguistics”, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol 71 (4), 
April 2002, pp. 16-21. 
32 The emblem of the Islamic Army in Iraq on: 
http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications129305&Category=publications&subca
tegory=0 
33 Stuart S. Kind, The Scientific Investigation of Crime, Manchester, Forensic Science 
Services, 1987, p. 43. 
34 Nordby, op.cit., p. 206. 
35 Martin Rudner, “Using Financial Intelligence Against the Funding of Terrorism”, 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol 19(1), 2006, pp.36ss. 
 
 
